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SECURITY INTERESTS IN AIRCRAFT
The Uniform Commercial Code' provides 49 states 2 with a comprehen-
sive system for the perfection of security interests and the determination of
priorities among conflicting security interests. With the composition of Article
9 the drafters of the Code have attempted "to provide a simple and unified
structure within which the immense variety of present-day secured financing
transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater certainty.'' To
achieve this end the Code sets forth the steps necessary for the perfection
of a security interest. The first step is attachment. A security interest "at-
taches" under the Code when an agreement has been made, when value has
been given and when the debtor acquires a property right in the collateral. 4
This interest is valid only between the parties themselves and against those
third parties who have actual notice of the outstanding interest; 5
 the addi-
tional step of "perfection" is necessary for protection against third parties
not on actual notice. Perfection of an interest may be accomplished under
the Code by three different methods, depending upon the type of collateral
being pledged.° Thus, possession by the secured party of certain types of
collateral will perfect a security interest in that collateral, 7
 while attachment
is enough to perfect another type of interest. 8
 However, a third method,
filing, is the most important means for perfection of a security interest under
the Code .° This practice calls for the filing of a financing statement or some
other suitable document in a specified central location or locations." The
underlying assumption is that the filed instrument is sufficiently available
to third parties so that they may fairly be regarded as being on notice of the
interest." Thus the effect of filing has been characterized as raising a duty
1 All Uniform Commercial Code citations are to the 1962 Official Text.
2 For a table of states which have adopted the Code, and the effective date of
adoption, see 1 P. Coogan, W. Hogan & D. Vagts, Secured Transactions Under the
Uniform Commercial Code vii (1967).
a U.C.C. § 9-101, Comment.
4 U.C.C. § 9 -204(1).
5 See U.C.C. § 9-204; U.C.C. § 9-204, Comment I.; and U.C.C. § 9-301(3).
6
 U.C.C. § 9-302, and sec generally Ruud, The Perfection of Security Interests Under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code—How? When? Where? How Often? 44
Texas L. Rev. 724 (1966).
7 This is the exclusive means for perfecting security interests in instruments other
than instruments which constitute part of chattel paper. U.C.C. § 9-304(1).
8 For example, attachment will perfect a purchase money security interest in farm
equipment having a value of less than $2,500, U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (c) ; and a purchase
money security interest in consumer goods, U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (d).
9 With few exceptions, see notes 7 & 8 supra, filing is required for perfection of
security interests under the Code. U.C.C. § 9-302.
10 The provisions governing filing are to be found in Article 9, Part 4.
11 U.C.C. § 9-302, Comment 1 states that "[slubsection (3) further sets out certain
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in security holders to check the central file before entering into a financing
transaction. 12 In contrast, security interests in those types of collateral which
may be perfected without filing are of such a nature that "notice" of the
interest is of little importance or is already given.'"
The effectiveness of perfection by filing is greatly hampered when the
collateral in which an interest is held is highly mobile. A highly mobile self-
propelling chattel such as a ship or airplane may be moved easily from
state to state and used in widely separate geographic areas. It is, therefore,
less reasonable to presume an out-of-state party to be on notice of an out-
standing security interest when that interest is recorded in some remote place.
This problem has long been recognized by the federal government, which
has responded by enactment of positive legislation providing for federal
recording systems for specified types of collateral." In the area of aircraft
security interests, the Federal Aviation Act" provides for the recording of all
security interests and conveyances in aircraft." With the enactment of the
Federal Aviation Act, state law provisions for filing are superseded. Section
9-104 of the Code recognizes this preemption," and courts have almost
unanimously held that the federal recording provisions supersede state law."
Comment 1 to section 9-104 acknowledges that recording under the federal
statute is the equivalent to filing under Article 9, but it then asserts that
"to the extent that the Civil Aeronautics Act does not regulate the rights of
parties to and third parties affected by such transactions, security interests in
aircraft remain subject to this Article, pending passage of federal legislation! 19
According to the Comment, the federal statute determines the validity of an
interest, but the Code determines the priority of any valid interest. The fed-
eral law is deemed not to have superseded the entire area of aircraft con-
veyancing. The courts have not always agreed with this view, but it appears
transactions to which the filing provisions of this Article do not apply; these are cases
where alternative systems for giving public notice of a security interest are available,"
(Emphasis added.)
12 See In Re Veterans' Air Express, 76 F. Supp. 684, 688 (D.N.J. 1948), a pre-Code
case.
13 For instance security interests in letters of credit may be perfected when the
secured party takes possession of them. U.C.C. § 9-305. See note 11 supra.
1.1 See the Federal Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. § 911-84 (1964), which provides for
filing in a ship's home port.
15 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964).
16 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1964).
17 U.G.C. § 9-104 reads in part:
This Article does not apply (a) to a security interest subject to any statute
of the United States such as the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, to the extent that
such statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by trans-
actions in particular types of property. .
18 See In Re Veterans' Air Express, 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948) ; Blalock v.
Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E.2d 610 (1949). Present federal law, the Federal Aviation
Act, does not substantially alter the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act (C.A.A.).
16 This Comment, therefore, presumably applies to present law as well as to the
C.A.A. But see Aviation Credit Corp. v. Gardner, 174 Misc. 798, 22 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct.
1940), which held that when planes are used only in intrastate commerce the federal
law did not preempt at all. The holding of this case is unique.
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that any questions have now been settled in favor of the Code position
as explained in Comment 1 to section 9-104."
The purpose of this comment is to compare the relevant section of
the Federal Aviation Act with analogous provisions of the Code in order to
describe the "interaction" 21
 between the Code and the Federal Aviation Act,
to determine to what extent the courts have held the Act to preempt the
Code, and to suggest a scheme of priorities in aircraft for the future.
I. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
In 1938, the Congress promulgated the Civil Aeronautics Act. 22 One of
the provisions of this Act established the first federal recording system for
aircraft." This provision was continued with minor changes in Section 503
of the Federal Aviation Act. Two subsections of section 503 are especially
concerned with recording. The first of these, section 503(c) reads:
No conveyance or instrument the recording of which is pro-
vided for by subsection (a) of this section, shall be valid in respect
of such aircraft, aircraft engine or engines, propellers, appliances,
or spare parts against any person other than the person by whom
the conveyance or other instrument is made or given, his heir or de-
visee, or any person having actual notice thereof, until such convey-
ance or other instrument is filed for recordation in the office of the
Administrator.... 24
That "f nlo conveyance . . . shall be valid . . . until such conveyance is filed
for recordation in the office of the Administrator" has been interpreted to
mean that all unrecorded interests in aircraft are invalid against third parties
without notice, 25
 and, therefore, will fail when opposed by a recorded interest.
20 There was some resistance to the claim that federal law preempted only in the
area of recording. In Re Veterans' Air Express, 76 F. Supp. 684, 686 (D.N.J. '1948),
in dicta, declared that the F.A.A. preempted the entire area of aircraft conveyancing.
This concept found some support in Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga, App. 537, 541, 51 S.E.2d
610, 613 (19.49), but it is generally agreed that the F.A.A. preempts only state filing
statutes as to their formal requirements and their effect on perfection. See State Sec.
Co. v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc., 351 F.2d 225, 229 (10th Cir. 1966) ; Aircraft Inv.
Corp. v. Pezzani & Reid Equip. Co., 205 F. Supp. 80, 83 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
21 The "interaction" takes place when the instrument is validated under federal
law and then submitted to the conditions of the state Iaw for perfection or priority.
22 49 U.S.C. § 401 (1964).
23 49 U.S.C. § 523 (1964).
24 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1964).
25
 See In Re Veterans' Air Express, 76 F. Supp, 684, 688 (D.N.J. 1948),
Mt is clear that the Congress has prescribed the only way in which aircraft may
be transferred and in which liens upon aircraft may be duly recorded. In this
manner, all persons dealing with aircraft are upon full legal notice concerning
possible liens and are charged with the duty of inquiry at the central recording
office of the Civil Aeronautics Administration with respect to any aircraft in
which they might be concerned.
This statement, although correct when made, has been superseded with regard to buyers in
the ordinary course by U.C.C. § 9-307(1). See the discussion at pp. 978-80 infra.
Both Veterans' and Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E.2d 610 (1949), held
that the necessity for recordation extended to aircraft used only a intrastate commerce.
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Similarly, under the Code an interest which must be filed to be perfected
will fail if not properly recorded and if opposed by a superior interest. 26
Under the Federal Aviation Act, notice of an outstanding interest, whether
it be actual notice or public notice, will validate that instrument through
recordation. Under the Code, a party knowing of the security interest must
treat that interest as being perfected.27 Thus, the effect of recording under
Section 503 of the Federal Aviation Act is analogous to the effect of filing
under the Code. The same status is achieved by the recording of the interest
and the same peril is risked by the failure to record.
The requirement that the federal recording be made at one central office
responds to the problems raised by highly mobile collateral such as aircraft.
This response reflects the Code's classification of the methods of perfection
according to the type of collateral. Section 503(c), therefore, presents a syn-
thesis of the essential provisions of the Code in filing for perfection, and, by
so doing, it has established the need for recording, by warning that no
unrecorded conveyance or instrument shall be valid. Because it sufficiently
provides for the recording of all conveyances and interests in aircraft, section
503(c) has preempted the filing provision embodied in the Code. 28
Section 503(d) provides that every properly recorded conveyance "shall
from the time of its filing for recordation be valid as to all persons without
further or other recordation. . . ." 29
 If one has recorded properly under Sec-
tion 503(c) of the Federal Aviation Act, the instrument is valid under section
503 (d) and all parties are considered to be on notice." Since the state filing
provisions have been nullified by federal preemption, the compliance or non-
compliance with them cannot add to or detract from this validity.
One recording is sufficient to meet the requirements of section 503 and,
thus, one single recordation will validate an instrument for all time, state law
and the Code provisions notwithstanding." Federal validation, then, is in
every respect analogous to Code perfection: actual notice or recordation in
the proper central file protects the recorded instrument against third-party
claimants. But, under the Code, even a perfected interest is not unassailable=
Therefore, to determine the effect of perfection through filing under the
And so, all aircraft are covered by the F.A.A. recording provisions. See United States v.
United Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 52, 54 (D. Conn. 1948). "The statute [F.A.A.], by its
recordation requirement, voids as to third parties, without actual notice, conveyances
not recorded."
26 See U.C.C. § 9-301.
27 See note 5 supra. But see the "race aspects" in U.C.C. § 9-312.
28 	§ 9-302, Comment 9 states: "Perfection of a security interest under a
state or federal statute of the type referred to in subsection (3) has all the consequences
of perfection under the provisions of this Article." Subsection (3) says that "the filing
provisions of this Article do not apply to a security interest in property subject to a
statute (a) of the United States which provides for a national registration or filing of
all security interests in such property...." See also U.C.C. § 9-302, Comment 8.
2D 49 U.S.C. § 1403(d) (1964).
36 See In Re Veterans' Air Express, 76 F. Supp. 684, 688 (D.N.J. 1948), and see
note 25 supra.
31	§ 9-403(2) provides that filing will not perfect an interest for more than
five years. U.C.C. § 9-403(3) provides for refiIing.
:; 2
 Priorities among perfected security interests are determined by U.C.C. § 9-312.
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Federal Aviation Act on an interest one must turn to the courts for inter-
pretation.33
II. APPLICATION OF FEDERAL RECORDATION TO STATE LAW
Under the Code a perfected security interest has priority depending upon
the type of that interest and upon the type of interest challenging it. The
Federal Aviation Act provides no such comprehensive system of priorities,
and, on its face, any recorded conveyance will prevail over any unrecorded
conveyance. Such a restricted reading of the statute could lead to inequitable
results in many cases by failure to recognize claims of superior interest not
dependent upon any instrument. Two such claims, those of the good faith
purchaser and of the buyer in the ordinary course, provide useful examples
of the actual interaction of state and federal law.
A. The Good Faith Purchaser."
American Aviation, Inc. v. Aviation Ins. Managers, Inc.35 provides an
illustration involving the good faith purchaser. The concept of a good faith
purchaser has long been used by the courts; and, under the Code, "[a] person
with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith pur-
chaser for value."3° In American Aviation a registered title holder, whose title
was properly recorded, sold his aircraft to Aviation Insurance as part of a
settlement. Aviation Insurance did not record its newly acquired ownership,
and had not done so when it sold the plane to a third party, retaining the bill
of sale from the registered owner until payment was made. Aviation Insurance
never received full payment from the third party, and so continued to hold
the bill of sale from the original, recorded owner. The aircraft changed hands
twice more before finally coming to rest with American Aviation. American
Aviation was undisputedly a good faith purchaser. 37
Application of the Federal Aviation Act recording provisions revealed
that neither party had a validly recorded instrument on which to base a claim
of ownership: Aviation Insurance because it did not record its title," and
33 Failure to record need not be fatal to one's interest in an aircraft, if that interest
has some basis upon which a claim may be made which is independent of an instrument
affecting title, but it is obviously risky to postpone recordation or to acquire
instruments which cannot be recorded. In general, see Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities,
25 J. Air L. & Corn. 193 (1958).
34 The Code does not define "good faith purchaser" but U.C.C. § 1-201(19) de-
fines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned"; U.C.C.
§ 1-201(33) defines a purchaser as one "who takes by purchase," with purchase defined
in U.C.C. § 1-201(32) as including "taking by sale, discount, negotiations, mortgage,
pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest
in property." Read in conjunction, the two terms would appear to mean a person who
acquires an interest in a chattel honestly believing that there is no reason why he should
not acquire such interest. When the purchaser himself is a merchant the Code imposes a
higher duty. See U.C.C.. § 2-103(1) (b). Article 2 applies to secured transactions which
involve a sale. See U.C.C. § 2-102.
35 244 Ark. 829, 427 S.W.2d 594 (1968).
30 U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
37 244 Ark, at —, 427 S.W.2d at 547.
38
 Aviation Insurance could have recorded its title, but it is arguable that upon
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American Aviation because it could not record it." Nevertheless, Aviation
Insurance argued that it stood in the shoes of the prior owner, and that since
it retained the recorded bill of sale from that owner it had a claim superior
to that of American Aviation. This argument proceeded by two steps: first,
since Aviation Insurance stood in the shoes of the prior, recorded owner,
it could proffer his recorded instrument as valid proof of its own claim; and
second, title had never passed to the third party so that it could not have
been transferred by him to later purchasers, good faith or otherwise. This
second argument depended upon the assumption that Section 503(c) of the
Aviation Act provided the only method for conveyancing aircraft, and that,
therefore, a third party who did not receive a recorded bill of sale, so that
he himself could record, had not received title to the aircraft.
The court concluded differently. Recognizing that state law applied to
all areas not preempted by the recording provisions of the Aviation Act,'"
the court found in favor of American Aviation. Aviation Insurance was required
to stand on the strength of its own title, and could not exploit the weakness
of American Aviation's. But Aviation Insurance had conveyed its title to the
third party who purchased the aircraft within the meaning of that term
under the applicable state Iaw,"' and American Aviation had subsequently
acquired rights in the aircraft as a good faith purchaser. The bill of sale
from the recorded owner, which Aviation Insurance had retained, was an
attempt by Aviation Insurance to create a security interest in the aircraft—
an unsuccessful attempt because of Aviation Insurance's failure to record the
instrument. As a result, Aviation Insurance had no valid claim to title,
because state law declared that title had passed, and because the federal
recording provisions had voided Aviation's unrecorded security interest.'"
Clearly a good faith purchaser will prevail over an unrecorded security
interest. But this result raises the question whether Aviation Insurance could
have prevailed over American Aviation if it had recorded its security interest.
American suggests that recordation would protect an interest against a good
faith purchaser; Clearly the good faith purchaser would take "good title,'" 44
sale of the aircraft Aviation Insurance would be compelled to record its retainer of the
recorded bill of sale as a security interest.
39 American could not record because it did not have a bill of sale from the recorded
owner. 244 Ark. at —, 427 S.W.2d at 545.
49 Id. at —, 427 S.W.2d at 547.
41 The court relied on U.C.C. § 2-106(1), which states in part, "A 'sale' consists in
the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." The court relied further on
U.C.C. § 2-401(2) providing that
[u]nless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and
place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical
delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even
though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place; and
in particular and despite any reservation of a security interest by the bill of
lading .. .
244 Ark. at —, 427 S.W.2d at 547.
42 Id. at —, 427 S.W.2d at 547.
43 The recordation of a security interest provides public notice of an outstanding
interest. See note 5 supra. But, on the theory that the secured party had contributed
to a fraud by allowing the secured item to be put in the market place, the secured
party in the past was estopped from raising this argument. See discussion in Borchnan
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title good against all persons except the recorded owner. 45 Aviation Insurance,
therefore, would have been victorious, if it had recorded its retention of the
bill of sale from the recorded owner as a security interest.
The good faith purchaser is not substantially affected by the Federal
Aviation Act recording provision. Under the Code he will take "good title"
to the collateral even if the proper filing procedures have been followed by a
prior secured party. Recordation under the Aviation Act is analogous to Code
filing, and the good faith purchaser takes "good title" in aircraft under the
federal law just as he would under the Code. Primarily, this result follows
because the status of a good faith purchaser is not affected by filing provi-
sions. But, although he takes "good title," he will take subject to any properly
recorded interest. It is certain, then, that a good faith purchaser will not
prevail against a recorded interest; another claim, that of the buyer in the
ordinary course, is stronger and may be more successful.
B. The Buyer in the Ordinary Course"
Section 9-307(1) provides that "[a] buyer in the ordinary course of
business . . . takes free of a security interest created by his seller even
though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows
of its existence." In Northern Illinois Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co.,47 a dealer
in aircraft had executed a security agreement with a bank, and then had
sold the aircraft to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. It was argued
Inv. Co. v. Peoples Bank, 320 S.W.2d 72, 77 (Mo. 1959). With the advent of filing
systems this estoppel principle became less important. Since filing was deemed to be
public notice, and a duty had been raised in the purchaser to check the central files, the
courts would not allow a remiss purchaser to raise the defense of estoppel. But public
notice does not disqualify persons as good faith purchasers, since only by having actual
knowledge may a person be so disqualified, the test for good faith in the case of a
non-merchant being "honesty in fact." See U.C.C. § 1-201(19). But see note 34 supra.
Under the Code, then, all non-merchant purchasers without actual knowledge of an
outstanding interest are good faith purchasers who take "good title" to the secured and
perfected item. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1). American Aviation relies on language from State
Sec. Co. v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc., 355 F.2d 225, 230 (10th Cir. 1966).
Further, under § 1403(c), supra, [referring to § 503(c) of the F.AA.l Securities'
mortgage is invalid as to good faith purchasers, since it did not register its
mortgage with the Federal Aviation Agency. And the failure of Owens [the
purchaser] to register his title does not benefit Securities, since Securities must
stand on the strength of its own title and cannot recover on the weakness of
Owens' title.
244 Ark. at —, 427 S.W.2d at 548 (emphasis added). It should be noted that State
Securities turned on Owens' status as a buyer in the ordinary course, and not on his
status as a good faith purchaser.
44 See U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
45
 Compare U.C.C. § 2-403(1), providing that good faith purchasers take "good
title," with U.C.C. § 9-307(1), stating that a buyer in the ordinary course of business
"takes free of a security interest created by his seller." From this language it is clear
that the drafters have been explicit wherever they desire to have a party take title free
of any security interests.
40 U.C.C. § 1-201(9) provides that a "buyer in the ordinary course of business
means a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in
violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys
in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind. .. ."
47 284 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
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that the Aviation Act preempted the entire field of conveyancing of aircraft
and that, since the bank had recorded its interest and, therefore, had a valid
claim, the Act operated to give priority to the bank. The court rejected this
argument and held that the Act preempted only state law in the area of
recording, and that other state provisions dealing with the priority of a valid
instrument against other valid claims were controlled by state law. Since the
buyer in the ordinary course had recorded his ownership properly under the
federal statute and therefore had a valid instrument on which to make his
claim, his status under the Code gave him title unencumbered by the security
interest created by his seller, the dealer.
The bank could not protect itself in this situation even by recording:18
Of course, by properly recording its interest in the aircraft, the bank had
served notice on the world of the outstanding interest. That notice would
effectively destroy the claim of a good faith purchaser by subjecting him
to the recorded interest,4° but a buyer in the ordinary course takes title
even though he has knowledge of the outstanding interest created by his
seller. The fact that constructive notice has been given by recordation is,
therefore, immaterial to him: he must have knowledge of the fact that the
secured party has restricted sale of the chattel until the interest has been
removed. Since the Code regards knowledge as actual knowledge, 5° construc-
tive notice of an outstanding restriction on a merchant who has created a
security interest will not protect the secured party. The buyer in the ordinary
course is clearly unaffected by the compliance or non-compliance with the
recording provisions of the Aviation Act,
The buyer in the ordinary course enjoys the same protections as under
the Code when the federal recording provisions are applied. He will take
title free of outstanding interests so long as he does not have actual knowl-
edge that the sale is in violation of the rights of the secured party. The
Aviation Act recording provisions do not affect his position, essentially be-
cause constructive notice given by filing is deemed by the Code to have no
effect on his status. The cases involving the good faith purchaser and buyer
in the ordinary course demonstrate the interaction of the Code and the
Federal Aviation Act: an instrument made valid by recordation occupies the
same relative position as an instrument filed under the Code. 51 Such an inter-
est is not unassailable merely because it is valid, and may be successfully at-
tacked by a claim given priority under the Code. The cases discussed, there-
fore, reached the same result as cases decided under the Code filing provisions.
Lien holders without actual notice also may make claims against holders
49 U.C.C. § 9-307, Comment 2 explains, "Mt results that the buyer takes free if
he merely knows that there is a security interest which covers the goods but takes sub-
ject if he knows, in addition, that the sale is in violation of some term in the security
agreement not waived by the words or conduct of the secured party." See also Com-
ment, Section 9-307(1) of the U.C.C.: The Scope of the Protection Given a Buyer in
Ordinary Course of Business, 9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 985 (1968).
49 The good faith purchaser would take "good title" but subject to the interest.
See the text at pp. 976-77 supra.
50 Sec U.C.C. § 1-201(25).
51 U.C.C. 1 9-302, Comment 9. See also note 28 supra.
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of security interests perfected under the Code." Two recent cases, one involv-
ing mechanics liens on aircraft and the other involving accessions to aircraft
illustrate the alteration made by the Aviation Act in state law and the Code
in this area.
C. Subsequent Liens
Section 9-310 provides that
[w]hen a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security in-
terest, a lien upon goods in the possession of such person given by
statute or rule of law for such materials or services takes priority
over a perfected security interest unless the lien is statutory and
the statute expressly provides otherwise.
A mechanics lien must arise from an independent state statute or from case
law separate from the Code. Such a lien will have priority under the Code
over earlier interests unless its is statutory and the statute creating it ex-
pressly states the contrary. It was clearly the intention of the drafters of the
Code to leave to the preexisting state law the determination of the priority of
mechanics liens. And, since preexisting law was to be responsible for the
creation of such liens, the Code also left to the state the determination of
the requisites for perfection.
In Smith v. Eastern Airmotive Corp., 53 Smith purchased an aircraft
and mortgaged it with a bank, which duly recorded its security interest.
Later, the plane was damaged by a lessee who turned it over to Eastern
for repairs, and who then defaulted. Eastern claimed that its mechanics lien
had priority over the earlier chattel mortgage. In fact, New Jersey Iaw
granted express priority both to mechanics liens and to liens for storage
expenses with no requirement for filing. 54
 The Superior Court of New Jersey,
however, held that Section 503 (c) of the Aviation Act applied, requiring
proper recordation before a claim to a mechanics lien could be valid. The
proceeds of the sale of the plane were awarded to Smith since Eastern's
mechanics lien was unrecorded and therefore void. In dicta, the court strongly
implied that Eastern's claim would have been good had it been validated
through proper recordation.55
Eastern by no means stands alone, and in fact relies heavily on the
logic of earlier cases.ae Of these, International Atlas Servs. v. Twentieth Cen-
52 W. Wilder & F. Hart, Forms and Procedures under the U.C.C. 11 91.29 (1966).
53 99 N.J. Super. 340, 240 A.2d 17 (Super. Ct. 1968).
54 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 44-2 (1952).
55 "Atlas could have fully protected its rights in these engines and preserved a
good title throughout the world by taking advantage of this national system of recorda-
tion and recording its interest in specifically numbered aircraft engines with the Federal
Aviation Agency." 99 N.J. Super. at 347, 240 A.2d at 21, quoting from International Atlas
Servs., Inc. v. Twentieth Century Aircraft Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 434, 440, 59 Cal. Rptr.
495, 498, 499 (1967).
56 In particular, United States v. United Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn.
1948), and Continental Radio Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d 359
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
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fury Aircraft Co.F. went somewhat farther than fast ern. Here the question
was whether a recorded chattel mortgage would prevail over the unrecorded
retained ownership interest of a mechanic. Atlas, the mechanic, had installed
one of its own engines in the mortgaged aircraft as part of a standard repair
procedure known as a Q.E.C. (quick engine change). The court recognized
that California law gave explicit priority to Atlas.58 Tn fact, it was pointed
out that California liberalized its law to favor the mechaniO° Under the
older law the mechanic was unable to get his engine back from the party
claiming a security interest in the whole aircraft in accord with the principle
that one should not separate from the whole a thing that had been integrated
into it. The older law provided for reimbursement for the lost engine, but
was changed to allow the mechanic to recover its interest in the Q.E.C.
engine, and that interest, characterized by the court as a security interest,
was void under section 503 (c). Atlas' claim to anything in the engine was
defeated by its failure to record.G°
Under the Code an unrecorded mechanics lien might very well success-
fully attack a prior perfected security interest. But, under the Aviation Act
recording provisions, it has been held that an unrecorded lien cannot be
successful." This difference clearly reflects the broad language of the federal
provisions and raises the question whether the policy underlying the Code's
treatment of mechanics liens is preferable to the federal provisions. In fact,
a further question is raised: does the federal statute preempt state law in
the area of subsequent lien holders? The question has been answered in the
affirmative. This answer may derive some justification from the principle that
federal statutes preempt only state law in conflict with the purpose of the
federal enactment. The purpose of the Aviation Act recording provisions was
to help protect secured parties dealing in aircraft. Obviously, the requirement
that mechanics file their liens does not afford added protection to these
secured parties, since the simple act of filing may give the mechanics priority.
No conflict between a state policy which may not require filing and the
federal purpose is apparent, since in subsequent lien situations there is no
reliance by the prior security holder on the fact that the subsequent lien
is unrecorded. It is submitted that since no conflict properly exists between
Section 503 (c) of the Federal Aviation Act and the Code sections dealing
with subsequent liens, the decisions to the contrary are conceptually incorrect.
57 251 Cal. App. 2d 434, 59 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1967).
58 "It would appear, then, that under California law Atlas at a minimum should
recover the value of its engines and at a maximum should recover the engines them-
selves." Id. at 438, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
59 This was accomplished when California enacted U.C.C. § 9-314. See 251 Cal.
App. 2d at 438, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
69 "As we see it, general California law on the subject of title and liens to personal
property in relation to component parts has been superseded by specific federal law
with respect to aircraft." 251 Cal. App. 2d at 438, 59 CaI. Rptr. at 497. The court went
on to state that "under subsection 1403(a) a conveyance or instrument which could
have been recorded, but was not, is until so recorded, invalid against a person without
actual notice of the conveyance or instrument," Id. at 440, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
61 International Atlas Servs., Inc. v. Twentieth Century Aircraft Co., 251 Cal. App.
2d 434, 59 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1967) ; Smith v. Eastern Airmotive Corp., 99 N.J. Super. 340,
240 A.2d 17 (Super Ct. 1968).
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However, the question now seems to be academic. Cases construing the fed-
eral law clearly require that mechanics send documentation of their lien to
a central filing location. This requirement does not impose too great a hard-
ship, and may well be justified by the simplicity of the Aviation Act provi-
sions. Any state policy failing to require filing for mechanics liens in general
loses much of its validity when the lien in question is attached to an item
as expensive as an airplane.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Aviation Act and the Code often interact to produce results
identical to those reached by the Code alone. It is true that in the area of
mechanics liens those decisions holding that the Aviation Act preempts the
Code with regard to subsequent lien holders have worked different and per-
haps unjust results. But the simple act of filing with the Aviation Act Ad-
ministrator precludes the potential injustice of these statutory differences.
In short, the filing provisions of the Federal Aviation Act have satisfied a
specific need by creation of a centralized system for perfection through filing.
In doing so the Act has not essentially altered the comprehensive Code sys-
tems of priorities.
JOHN P. BIRMINGHAM, JR.
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